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Causality never gained the status of a “law”
or “principle” in physics. Some recent literature
even popularised the false idea that causality is a
notion that should be banned from theory. Such
misconception relies on an alleged universality of
reversibility of laws of physics, based either on
determinism of classical theory, or on the multiverse
interpretation of quantum theory, in both cases
motivated by mere interpretational requirements for
realism of the theory.
Here I will show that a properly defined unambi-
guous notion of causality is a theorem of quantum
theory, which is also a falsifiable proposition of
the theory. Such causality notion appeared in
the literature within the framework of operational
probabilistic theories. It is a genuinely theoretical
notion, corresponding to establish a definite partial
order among events, in the same way as we do by
using the future causal cone on Minkowski space.
The causality notion is logically completely indepen-
dent on the misidentified concept of “determinism”,
and, being a consequence of quantum theory, is
ubiquitous in physics. In addition, since classical
theory can be regarded as a restriction of quantum
theory, causality holds also in the classical case,
although the determinism of the theory trivialises it.
I then conclude arguing that causality naturally
establishes an arrow of time. This implies that the
scenario of the “Block Universe” and the connected
“Past Hypothesis” are incompatible with causality,
and thus with quantum theory: they both are doomed
to remain mere interpretations and, as such, not
falsifiable, similarly to the hypothesis of “super-
determinism”.
The present opinion paper should be regarded as a
manifesto for more in-depth investigations for such a
relevant notion in sciences.
c© The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and
source are credited.
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1. Causality, the Cinderella of Physics
Causality has been always an undetermined and controversial notion in physics, perhaps due to
its involvement in a wide spectrum of heterogeneous disciplines, including all natural sciences,
pure philosophy, economics, and law.1 The controversial status of causality in modern physics is
witnessed by some mainstream divulgations, e.g. the recent book [8] of Sean M. Carrol, where on
pag. 62 he discredits the notion of causality in physics with the following lines
. . . we highlighted how Laplace’s conservation of information undermines the central role that Aristotle
placed on causality. Concepts like “cause” appear nowhere in Newton’s equations, nor in our more modern
formulations of the laws of nature. But we can’t deny that the idea of one event being caused by another is
very natural, and seemingly a good fit to how we experience the world.
And then, to add credit to his assertion, in the following page Carrol quotes the famous passage
by Bertrand Russel [9]:
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone
age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.
Carrol purports to convince the laymen that causality, although used at any instant of our
everyday life, nevertheless it is not a law of nature, but only a practical idea, and it is obsolete as
a theoretical tool. On the same lines is the article by J. D. Norton paper, whose title “Causation as
folk science” technically means that theorising in terms of cause and effects is a very primordial way
of reasoning in science, however, it does not correspond to a precise law or principle in physics at
the very fundamental level (see also Ref. [10]). This is evident in the following lines by Norton:
. . . the concepts of cause and effect are not the fundamental concepts of our science and that science is
not governed by a law or principle of causality [11].
The misidentification between causal reasoning and the existence of a causality principle seems
to be the reason why causality has remained in the realm of philosophy, and never achieved the
status of “principle”. Nevertheless, causality creeps in the physical theories in the form of ad
hoc assumptions based on empirical evidences, as when advanced potentials are discarded in
electrodynamics, or when we motivate the Kramers-Kronig relations. In other cases, causality is
embodied in the interpretation of the theory, as is the case of Special Relativity. Or else, causality
is so naturally embedded in our theoretical understanding, that its notion remains unconsciously
implicit even in recent axiomatised quantum foundations, as it happened in the seminal paper
by Lucien Hardy [12], which inspired the informational derivation of quantum theory [13–15] of
which Causality is now an axiom.2
It should be noted that the denial of existence of a principle of causality is generally motivated
within a classical theoretical view, as it is also evident in the above Carrol’s citation. As explained
in his book [8], the reason beneath such denial within classical physics is the time reversal
1The literature on causality is very extensive, due to the number of disciplines in which it is involved. Perhaps the most
natural connection between concepts of causality in different branches of knowledge is the one at the borderline between
physics and philosophy, starting from the early work of Aristotle, up to the Renée Descartes, who broke the ground for the
modern view of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. A modern philosopher who focused on causality was Wesley Salmon, who
made several attempts to discriminate “cause” from “effect” in physical causation, without relying on the arrow of time (see
e.g. his book [1] and his articles in Ref. [2]). Later Phil Dowe devoted his book [3] to a critical analysis of all such attempts, and
proposed alteratives. In all these studies an hidden issue is the objectivity of the assessment of which is the cause and which
the effect, whereas, as shown in the present paper, causality is a genuinely theoretical notion, and depends on our theory of
connections among events. The causality notion is also affected by the same objectivity bias about the same of probability
notion when causality is considered in a probabilistic context. In this sense it is also the core of Hume’s problem of induction.
Additional interesting recent books on the subject of causality are Refs. [4–7].
2Later in Ref. [16] Hardy recognised the role of the causality principle of Refs. [14,15].
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symmetry of Newton’s and Maxwell’s laws. A possible source of misunderstanding here may be
the implicit assumption that the absence of a law would constitute a law by itself. However, both
Newton’s and Maxwell’s theories are compatible with an additional law that picks a preferred
direction of time, since one may equally state the same laws in integral form by means of
the retarded potentials only, and using them as the law formulation, from which Newton’s
and Maxwell’s original laws can be derived by differentiation, however, with the additional
time-arrow restriction.
A second reasoning underlying the denial of a causality principle, again of a classical-
theoretical origin, is the same fact that classical mechanics is deterministic, and the one-to-one
correspondence between cause and effect without assuming the arrow of time (the effect occurs
after the cause) puts the two notions in one-to-one correspondence, making them interchangeable.
Such reasoning is also the origin of the traditional misidentification of the notion of causality with
that of determinism–whereas, instead, the two are logically utterly independent.3 And, indeed,
the two notions are so deeply entangled in some literature, that they are often merged into the
commonplace of causal determinism. An example of such identification is the quotation by the
founding father of quantum theory, Max Planck:
An event is causally determined if it can be predicted with certainty [18].
The confusion between causality and determinism is notoriously the main source of the
common misinterpretation of perfect EPR quantum correlations (e.g. from a singlet), that
originated the Einstein’s motto “spooky action at a distance”, whose literal interpretation
corresponds to the subliminal interpretation of the correlations being causal.
The advent of Quantum Mechanics has led us to contemplate causal relations as generally
probabilistic, as it is the case in all natural and human sciences. Although a probabilistic context
for physical causation had already been considered by several authors [3,19,20], the precise
mathematical formulation of causality has been given only recently in the context of operational
probabilistic theories (OPT) [13] (see Sect. 2). Such formulation covers all possible instances of the
notion, and corresponds to set up a partial ordering among events, thus requiring a network
description, which is embedded in the operational framework. The OPT formulation is perfectly
compliant with the historical philosophical concept of causality since David Hume, along with its
usage in common reasoning, inference, and modelling in sciences [20]. From its OPT formulation
we can also appreciate that, being an ingredient of a probabilistic logical inference approach,
causality is a genuinely theoretical notion, and this simple fact closes all debates about “objective”
identification of causes versus effects without assuming the arrow of time, as in the case in
the Phil Dowe analysis [3] of Wesley Salmon attempts [1,2]. Even the same issue of Hume’s
induction corresponds to such misinterpretation of causality as an objective notion, whereas,
instead, causality is a purely theoretical ingredient, and, being probabilistic, it depends on prior
assumptions.4
3The misidentification of the two notions of “causality” and “determinism” is hidden ubiquitously in the literature. For
example, it is the reason why the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory is also called causal interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The logical independence between the two notions of causality and determinism is proved by the existence of causal theories
that are not deterministic (e.g. quantum theory), and viceversa of deterministic theories that are not causal (e.g. the OPT
presented in [17]). (In a probabilistic context “determinism” is identified with the tautological property of a theory of having
all probabilities of physical events being equal to either zero or one, which is clearly a definition with no causal connotation.
Originally, the notion of determinism arose within the clockwork-universe vision of classical mechanics, assessing that the
state of a system at an initial time completely determines the state at any later time.)
While in classical theory the notions of causality and determinism degenerate in a conceptual overlapping, they completely
disentangle in quantum theory (and, more generally, in an OPT [13,14]). This is due to the fact that classical mechanics
identifies the state (point in the phase-space) with the measurement-outcome, while the two concepts are radically different
in quantum theory, and more generally in OPT’s, allowing us to define determinism outside the framework of classical
mechanics which is already deterministic.
4In this sense the criticism of Bertrand Russell is pertinent to such objective formulations, along with the purely deterministic
notion, and all other criticisms are completely overcome by the OPT formulation.
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In the next section we will see how causality is a theorem of quantum theory, and, as such,
is a falsifiable proposition of the theory. We will also see how the present notion of causality
is equivalent to the Einsteinian notion, and distills all the guises in which causality appears in
physics.
2. Causality is a theorem of Quantum Theory
Quantum theory is an operational probabilistic theory (OPT) [15]. An OPT is a theory that can
predict joint probability distributions of multiple events depending on a graph of connections
between them. The theory associates mathematical structures to both “nodes” and “links” of the
graph, which are transformations and the systems of the theory, respectively.
We will now report a presentation of quantum theory as OPT based on von the Neumann
axiomatisation, and then state the causality principle, proving it as a theorem of the theory. Then,
we will see how the principle corresponds to set up a partial ordering among events, and it is
equivalent to the customary causality notion of special relativity. Finally, we will establish the
scientific value of the principle on the basis of its falsifiability.
(a) Quantum Theory as operational probabilistic theory
Quantum theory is an operational probabilistic theory (OPT), namely a theory that predicts joint
probability distributions of events depending on a graph of connections among them. The graph
is what is generally referred to as “quantum circuit” in the quantum information literature. It is
a DAG (acronym for “directed acyclic graph”), here conventionally directed from the left to the
right. An example of DAG represented as a customary quantum circuit is given in Fig. 1. The
nodes of the graph are the events (in figure denoted as Ψi,Aj , . . .). The links of the graph are
the systems of the theory (denoted as A,B, . . .). The collection of all possible alternative events
Aj with overall unit probability is called test, and denoted as {Aj}j∈X with X (finite countable)
probability space.5 By definition the test is complete if the coarse-grained event AX :=
∑
j∈XAj
is deterministic, namely it occurs with unit marginal probability.6
According to the graph orientation, the wires on the left side of an event box are the input
systems, those on the right side the output systems. There are special events with trivial input
system, called preparations (represented by boxes with the left rounded side), and events with
trivial output system, called observations (represented by boxes with the right rounded side).
When needed we will denote the trivial system by I. The complete circuit is therefore a closed
DAG, as in Fig. 1.
We can compose events in parallel and in sequence to built up composite events, as we
normally do with quantum circuits, and contextually we compose systems shared by a sequence
of two events, e.g. systems A and E in Fig. 1 into the composite system AE in Fig.1.7
We now focus only on the probabilistic nature of the event, abstracting from its specific
instance, and take the equivalence class of events that occurs with the same joint probability in all
possible circuits. We call such equivalence class transformation, and for preparation events we call
it state, and for observation events we call it effect. By definition a state followed at the output by
a transformation is a new state, and similarly an effect preceded at its input by a transformation
is a new effect. In this way we can easily understand that every closed circuit can be regarded as
the composition of a state with an effect (or a composition of a preparation with an observation):
see Fig. 2.
5For those not familiar with quantum information, I would emphasise that the graph description can equally represent an
experiment made in the lab, or a “natural process”, e.g. corresponding to a Feynman diagram.
6A deterministic transformation is called quantum channel in the quantum information literature.
7For a detailed axiomatic formulation of composition rules of events and systems see Ch. 4 of book [15].
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Figure 1: A closed quantum circuit representing theoretical connections between events. The
circuit nodes (depicted as boxes) represent events. The circuit links represent systems of the
theory. The graph is a closed directed acyclic graph (DAG), undirected from left to right (input
systems for each event are on the left of the box, output systems on the right). The joint probability
of all events depends parametrically on the graph. The same graph can be used to represent the
complete joint test, upon substituting each event, say Aj with the test {Aj}j∈X with probability
space X.
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Figure 2: Every closed circuit is equivalent to composing a preparation with an observation.
A complete formulation of an OPT is given by providing the mathematical description of its
systems and its transformations. Within the OPT framework, the von Neumann axiomatization
of quantum theory8 can be formulated as follows:9
Quantum Theory: each system A is associated to an Hilbert spaceHA, and for the trivial
system one hasHI =C. A transformation T ∈Transf(A→B) is described by a completely
positive (CP) trace-non-increasing map from T(HA) to T(HB), the transformation being
deterministic when the map is trace-preserving.
As mentioned, states and effects are special types of transformations, having trivial input system
and trivial output system, respectively. We then have
(i) The set of states of system A is St(A) := Transf(I→A). It follows that the states of
A are represented by positive maps10 from [0, 1] to T+≤1(HA), the deterministic states
corresponding to unit trace. In particular St(I)≡T+≤1(C)≡ [0, 1] are probability values.
(ii) The set of effects of system A is Eff(A) = Transf(A→ I). It follows that the effects of A
are positive maps from T+≤1(HA) to [0, 1], hence they are functionals of the form εi(·) =
8Here we are considering the quantum theory of abstract systems, without the original mechanical connotation of the theory,
in which case the theory is usually referred to as Quantum Mechanics.
9We use the following common notation: Bnd(H) (Bnd+(H)) denotes the set of bounded (positive) operators on the Hilbert
spaceH, T (H) (T+(H)) denotes the set of (positive) trace-class operators overH, T+≤1(H) denotes the set of positive trace-
class operators ρ overH with Tr[ρ]≤ 1, Transf(A→B) is the set of transformations from system A to system B, St(A) is
the set of states of system A, Eff(A) its set of effects. All maps in the following are linear.
10For trivial input or output system the CP map is simply a positive map.
6rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org
P
hil.
Trans.
R
.S
oc.
A
0000000
..................................................................
TrA[·E] where TrA denotes the partial trace over HA and Bnd+(HA)3E ≤ IA. TrA is
the only deterministic effect of A.
This is all what we need to know about quantum theory.
We need now to remark that classical theory can also be formulated as an OPT [15], and it is
a restriction of quantum theory to maximal simplexes of states contained in the quantum convex
sets of states, and restricting transformations accordingly.11
(b) The causality theorem
For an OPT the causality principle is stated as follows [15]:
Causality principle: The probability of preparations is independent on the choice of
observations.
We now show that the causality principle is a theorem of quantum theory.
Theorem 2.1. Quantum theory satisfies the causality principle.
Proof. Since TrA is the unique deterministic effect for A, one has
∑
j∈Y{Ej}= IA for every
observation test. The joint probability of preparation and observation is given by
p(i, j) := Tr[Ejρi], (2.1)
and the marginal probability of preparation is∑
j∈Y
p(i, j) =
∑
j∈Y
Tr[ρiEj ] = Tr[ρi], (2.2)
which is independent on the choice of observation {Ej}j∈Y .
Notice the asymmetry between preparations and observations. Indeed, differently from Eq.
(2.2), the marginal probability of observation is∑
i∈X
p(i, j) =
∑
i∈X
Tr[ρiEj ] = Tr[ρXEj ] (2.3)
which generally depends on the preparation {ρi}i∈X through ρX.
One can easily realise that for a general OPT an equivalent form of the causality postulate is
the following.
Causality principle (equivalent form): An OPT satisfies the causality postulate iff the
deterministic effect is unique, and depends only on the system of the theory.
Indeed, as seen in the proof of Theorem 2.1, taking the marginal probability of preparation
corresponds to coarse-grain the observation test into a deterministic effect. Therefore,
independence of deterministic effect on the observation test is equivalent to independence of
the marginal probability on the choice of the observation test.
In the book [15] it is also shown how the causality principle is also equivalent to the possibility
of normalising states, which in turn is equivalent to the possibility of preparing deterministically
11Classical theory reformulated as an OPT is the restriction of quantum theory, in which the set of states St(A) is limited to
the simplex Sdim(HA) that is the convex hull of a fixed maximal set of orthogonal pure quantum states, and restricting also
transformations accordingly. It is easy to see that the theory can be formulated as follows
Classical Theory: It is the OPT restriction of quantum theory corresponding to choosing Transf(A→B) =
T(nA, nB) the set of nA × nB sub-stochastic Markov matrices, with nA = dim(HA).
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any state via post-selection.12 Finally, it is shown how the causality postulate restricts the convex
structure of the theory, e.g. with the convex set of states shaped as an hyperplane-truncated cones
and those of effects shaped as spindlers.
(c) Causality is a partial ordering between events
The following definition establishes a partial ordering among events in a circuit.
Definition 2.2 (Partial ordering between events). For two events A and B in the same circuit, we say
that event A precedes event B if there is a undirected input-output path of the circuit that connects an
output system of A with an input system of B. We equivalently say that that B follows A.
Definition 2.2 holds equally well by substituting the word “event” with “test”. It introduces
the notions of input and output cones of a given event (test).
Definition 2.3 (Input and output cones of an event). The input cone of event A is the set of events
preceding A. Analogously the output cone of event A is the set of events following A.
In the presence of the Causality assumption in a general OPT, the input and output causal
cones are the respective causal cones (figure3) . Moreover, if we associate the input-output direction
with the arrow of time, the two cones become the equivalent of the past cone and future cone,
respectively.
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(a) Past (pink) and future (blue) causal cones of event Cl
in the circuit of Fig. 2.
a
(b) Past and future causal cone
the event a in customary causal-
network representation.
Figure 3: Causal cones of an event.
(d) Causality in Special Relativity
With the above notions in mind, it is now immediate to see that the causality principle is
equivalent to the following statement
12As remarked in [17], if the theory is not causal there exist states which cannot be prepared with certainty. In other words,
the post-selection procedure is not available.
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Corollary 2.4 (No-signaling from the future). An OPT is causal iff the marginal probability of any test
is independent on the choice of any test that does not belong to its past cone.
Proof. The statement is equivalent to say that the OPT is causal, if and only if for any test A that
does not follow a testB, one has that the marginal probability distribution of testA is independent
of the choice of test B. This statement implies the causality principle, since the latter is a special
case. The reverse implication is also true, since as we have seen, any closed circuit can be always
split into a preparation and an observation test, with the preparation containing test A and the
observation containing test B.
An tautological alternative statement of Corollary 2.4 is the following
Corollary 2.5 (No-signaling from the future). An OPT is causal iff the marginal probability of any
event is independent on which events can occur outside its past cone.
In the formulation of Corollary 2.5 causality has exactly the form used in special relativity,
within a deterministic scenario in a classical case. Indeed causality is the existence of a partial
ordering between events, which defines a “preceding” (and “following”) cone, and, viceversa, the
cone can be used to define the partial ordering. Thus logically the causality notion of OPTs (and
hence of quantum theory) is the same notion that we use in special relativity, although without
the need of introducing the Minkowski structure.
(e) Causality is falsifiable science
We see now that causality, being a theorem of quantum theory, is also experimentally falsifiable,
namely it allows us to formulate predictions that are falsifiable. Therefore, according to the
Popper’s demarcation criterion [21], causality is in all respects scientific theory.
An experiment for falsifying causality can be designed simply by building up a cascade
of two quantum measurements, e.g. two Stern-Gerlach apparata with pinhole-detection of
particles, with the possibility of changing the second apparatus at the output, .e.g. changing the
orientation of the magnetic field gradient. Two apparata in cascade correspond to the sequential
composition {BjAi}(i,j)∈X×Y ⊂Transf(A→C) of the two tests Aˆ= {Ai}i∈X ⊂Transf(A→B)
and Bˆ := {Bj}j∈Y ⊂Transf(B→C). Here test Aˆ belongs to the past cone of test Bˆ, and viceversa
test Bˆ belongs to the future cone of test Aˆ. Using the rules of quantum theory we have the causality
relations
pA(i) :=
∑
j∈Y
p(i, j) =
∑
j∈Y
Tr[BjAi(ρ)] = Tr[BYAi(ρ)] = Tr[Ai(ρ)], independent on test {Bj}j∈Y
pB(j) :=
∑
i∈X
p(i, j) =
∑
i∈X
Tr[BjAi(ρ)] = Tr[BjAX(ρ)], generally dependent on test {Ai}i∈X,
where we used the fact that the coarse graining BY :=
∑
j∈Y Bj is trace preserving (true also
for AX). One can now consider X = {0, 1} with Tr[A0(ρ)] = 0. Then, for example, the causality
principle would be falsified if upon changing test Bˆ to a different test Bˆ′, one would have
occurrence of the outcome 0 for test Aˆ.
(f) From Cinderella to Principle of Physics
The causality principle that here we have derived as a theorem of quantum theory, in Refs. [13,14]
has been used instead as the first of six information-theoretical postulates to derive quantum
theory in finite dimensions (a didactical derivation can be found in the textbook [15]). Recognising
causality as a postulate for the theory has allowed for the first time to consider variations of the
theory that do not satisfy it. This has spawn a full research line about a non-causal variations of
quantum theory, ranging from the theory of quantum combs [22] (which still has an interpretation
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in terms of an underlying causal theory) to theories with dynamical causal ordering [23–25,25,26],
and experimental tests have been also devised [27,28].
3. Analysis of the causality-denial sindrome in classical physics
We have seen the statement of the causality principle in terms of the independence of the marginal
probability of preparation-tests on the choice of observation-tests, or, shortly: independence of
preparations on observations. We argued that this statement distills all the guises in which
causality appears in physics. We have seen that the principle is a theorem of quantum theory,
but also classical theory must satisfy the principle, since it is a restriction of quantum theory.
Then, why it seems that there is no causality principle in classical physics, as Carrol asserts?
The answer is that within classical theory the principle of causality is trivialised in many
ways by the “realism of the theory”, i.e. the one-to-one correspondence between elements of
reality and elements of the theory. On one side, restricting to a deterministic scenario put causes
and effects (preparations and observations) in one-to-one correspondence, thus trivialising their
distinction. On the other side, classical theory makes the notion of “measurement” irrelevant,
since it is identified with the reading of the state, hence identifying “state” and “measurement
outcome”. Finally, in classical physics there is only one possible observation, whereas in quantum
theory inequivalent observations are introduced by complementarity, and this breaks the classical
identification between measurement and state.
What then causality means in the classical case? Although in a classical world there is no
choice of observation, yet one can chose the preparation,13 and this makes the formulation of
Corollary 2.5 appropriate. And, indeed, we have seen that this statement is shared by special
relativity, namely it is the usual Einsteinian notion. With the same argument Corollary 2.5 requires
discarding advanced potentials in electromagnetism.
Finally, it is worth recalling that causality is a genuinely theoretical notion, since it relies on a
theory of connections among events, namely the connections are established by an underlying
theoretical substratum. Thus, the Minkowski space-time structure per se has no bearing on causal
connections, but it is an underlying theory, e.g. Maxwell theory, which establishes which events
can be connected and which cannot.
4. Conclusions
Causality establishes an arrow of time, going from preparation to observation. This corresponds
to the usual arrow of time, the one that we use in our everyday experience. By denying causality,
Sean Carrol denies such arrow of time, against the everyday experience. He writes [8]:
The reason why there’s a noticeable distinction between up and down for us isn’t because of the nature of
space; it’s because we live in the vicinity of an extremely influential object: the Earth. Time works the same
way. In our everyday world, time’s arrow is unmistakable, and you would be forgiven for thinking that
there is an intrinsic difference between past and future.
In order to reconcile experience, he then invokes the Past Hypothesis of David Albert
In reality, both directions of time are created equal. The reason why there’s a noticeable distinction between
past and future isn’t because of the nature of time; it’s because we live in the aftermath of an extremely
influential event: the Big Bang. . . . The thing we need to add is an assumption about the initial condition
of the observable universe, namely, that it was in a very low-entropy state. Philosopher David Albert
has dubbed this assumption the Past Hypothesis. . . . What we know is that this initially low entropy is
responsible for the “thermodynamic” arrow of time,. . .
13The hypothesis of superdeterminism is discarded as methodologically non scientific, since the same falsifiability of a physical
law requires the independent variation of physical parameters in experiments.
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The idea that there is no distinction between past, present, and future was of Einstein himself,
who wrote in a letter to the family of Michele Besso, few days after Einstein learned of his death:
Now he has departed from this strange world a little ahead of me. That means nothing. People like us, who
believe in physics, know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent
illusion. [29]
Einstein here denies the existence of a time-arrow. However, one should not forget that he
has always been a stubborn opponent of quantum theory in his battle with Bohr. But everybody
nowadays would agree that who lost the battle was Einstein.
Data Accessibility. For a recent review on the causality postulate, see Chapt. 5 of the book [15].
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